Learning outcomes of the course unit
This class offers a chance for students to see how strategic problems can be tackled by means of the conceptual instruments developed by economists in the last decades. Students shall be guided in building effective insights concerning the pivotal structures of strategic problems, namely, the levers at disposal, best responses, Nash equilibria deemed to be feasile, and the properties characterizing such equilibria. The problem of cooperation will be touched upon, as well as the theoretical approach to "justice" (Rawls)
Course contents summary
Program (see the manual)
- Noncooperative static games with complete information (chapter 2; 5 hours)
- Focal-point and evolutionary equilibria (ch. 3; 5 h)
- Mixing pure strategies (ch. 5; 4 h)
- Static games with continuous strategies (ch. 7; 4 h)
- Imperfect competition (ch. 8, 4 h))
- Dynamic games with complete and perfect information (ch. 11, 4 h)
- Bargaining (ch. 12, 2 h).
Thomas J. Webster, Introduction to Game Theory in Business and Economics. M. E. Sharpe
Students will be guided through the problems by means of a selection of the chapters from the textbook, and will be asked with regularity to comment on the notions introduced. Discussions of case studies are meant to pin down the apllicational relevance of the concepts introduced.
Assessment methods and criteria
The final exam consists of a written test (a short essay and a problem), followed by a discussion menat to check the student’s skills concerning communicating the essence of a problem and the way of building arguments about solving that problem.